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Abstract
Lockheed Martin designs and builds commercial satellites to customers' specifications.
The customers, such as telecommunications companies and weather forecasters, are very
price sensitive and, usually, award contracts to the lowest priced bids. Lockheed
manufactures satellites using a combination of in-house manufacturing, purchasing, and
subcontracting (for subcontract parts). The subcontract parts constitute a majority of a
satellite's costs. Lockheed uses contracts and other supply management techniques to
stay competitive and to keep satellite, specifically subcontract part, costs under control.
Some of the subcontract part contracts are managed under subcontract agreements called
long-term agreements (LTA). A small supplier pool, long turnover (for bringing these
suppliers onboard), regulatory requirements, and capital-intensive nature of the industry
are important considerations in evaluating these LTAs. The LTAs embody the risks
inherent in project supply chains, specifically, price, currency, and supply risks. In such
events, LTAs can become a liability and can lead to monetary losses or discord with
suppliers. This thesis provides an overview of the satellite supply chain, analyzes supplier
relations to better understand the business dynamics, and analyzes LTAs to better control
the satellite input costs.
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1 Introduction
The space age started in 1957 with the launch of first satellite, Sputnik 1. After Sputnik,
the satellite development was rapid. Within next two years, weather and communication
satellites were launched. Satellites are now being used to provide services like earth
observation, television, telephones, navigation, Internet, weather, climate and
environmental monitoring, and space science. And the service growth continues. This
growth generates demand for more satellites. However, a satellite is defense article that is
also International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)-protected. As a consequence, the
satellite product and technology that is sold to commercial and foreign customers is less
advanced, and carefully regulated and protected. And thus, satellite manufacturers divide
all satellite orders, and consequently customers, into the following two categories:
commercial and government. Between these two categories, the demand for commercial
satellites has been significant. See figure 1.1 for in-orbit data for satellites.
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Figure 1.1. Estimate of Satellites (launch data through 4/1/2009), by Country (Source:
www.ucsusa.org)
The commercial satellite product and supply chain are different from their
government counterparts. The difference can be highlighted using the following three
factors - 1) government systems have more regulatory restrictions in terms of where a
contractor can source the subassemblies, 2) government systems are usually more
technologically advanced, and 3) the government satellite sourcing process is a superset
of the commercial supply chain; a government satellite is often prototyped to
specification to win a contract as against a commercial satellite which contract is won on
bid price.
A satellite supply chain has three stakeholders: customers (government or
commercial), contractors (satellite manufacturers e.g., Lockheed, Boeing), and suppliers.
From a contractor point of view, the regulatory restrictions affect government satellite
supply chain choices by limiting the sourcing options (suppliers) and affect commercial
supply chain choices by limiting the selling options (customers.) One more difference is
the difference in commercial and government satellite ordering process. Government
satellite supply chain is guided more by national interest and product performance than
by competition. Commercial customers buy satellites using competitive bids and, if
delivery schedule is met, price is the single most important factor. A satellite price is
directly determined by the raw material or subassembly costs. These costs comprise
about seventy to eighty percent of total satellite costs. Thus, effectively supply
management has become very critical to stay competitive in the space industry. Strategic
sourcing and partnerships are being used to keep costs low and to drive up efficiencies
[1].
The satellite industry is moving toward more collaborative partnerships with
suppliers to gain competitive advantage. The challenge, however, continues to be
managing relationships amid complexity. The contractors try to secure the supply for the
life of the projects using long-term agreements. In fact, a lot of times contractors and
suppliers bid as a consortium of providers to secure a contract (project). This helps the
contractor avoid getting stalemated by lack of supplies or getting stuck with a tier two or
unqualified supplier.
This thesis builds on input from Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company
(LMSSC), a division of Lockheed Martin Corporation. LMSSC has footprint in research,
design, development, integration, and manufacture of advanced satellite systems.
LMSSC, based in Denver, provides space systems for both government and commercial
sector. Lockheed, a contractor, uses long-term agreements (LTA) and general pricing
agreements (GPA) among other things, to keep the costs under check. LTA and GPA are
both a supply and a pricing agreement between a contractor and a supplier whereby they
agree on prices and quantities for a certain satellite part for a certain period of time. LTA
is usually two years' long while GPA is an yearly contract. That said, GPAs and LTAs
are used to procure different kind of items. GPAs are used to procure commodities while
LTAs are used to procure subcontract items. Subcontract items comprise about sixty
percent of a Lockheed satellite's raw material input costs. Commodities, subcontract
items, contractors, and suppliers are explained at length later on in sections 4 and 5.
The need to understand and manage the satellite supply costs, and a lack of
comprehensive literature on satellite systems supply chain is the motivation behind this
study. The research focuses on understanding the supplier relations and long-term
agreements (LTA) in the commercial satellite systems supply chain. That said, this study
provides an overarching strategic supply management perspective that is relevant to
government side as well.
The satellite supply chain explained in this study is a consequence of knowledge
and understanding gained through relevant literature, Internet, and interviews and surveys
with Lockheed and industry thought leaders. Kraljic's purchasing portfolio model is used
in this study to understand and to analyze the satellite supply management and
contractor-supplier relations. The focus has also been on understanding and using LTAs
as a strategic sourcing tool to keep the cost of supply low, to encourage partnership, and
to ensure supply for high-demand periods.
2 Review of the Literature
2.1 Contracts
Contractors should use a differentiated strategy in engaging with suppliers [2]. The focus
should be on suppliers with the greatest strategic importance. When an item being
sourced is not very specific to the contractor's product and a broad supply base exists,
competitive bidding may be best. The Japanese lean manufacturers strategically segment
their supply chain and subject to the nature of sourcing item pursue both close partnership
and arms-length relationships [3]. Bakos and Brynjolfsson [4] offer economic models to
establish that even if it is easy and cost effective to coordinate with a wide variety of
suppliers, firms can often maximize profits by relying on fewer sources. This reduces a
contractor's bargaining power but increases the incentive for a supplier to make
investments which yield good paybacks for both. In designing a supplier relationships
strategy, however, it is important for the contractor to consider interdependence. Supplier
dependence is the degree to which a supplier relies on the business of a contractor for its
revenue stream. In a study of supplier innovation in the automotive industry, Kamath and
Liker [5] found that independent suppliers are motivated to innovate only when it makes
economic sense. However, dependent suppliers, if they have a good idea of the kinds of
innovations that a contractor values, can often be motivated to innovate in the absence of
financial incentives. For a contractor, dependence refers to relying on a supplier for
unique knowledge or capabilities critical to the contractor's product. It is a function of the
availability of alternative sources.
2.1.1 Communication
Good communication between the contractor and supplier facilitates innovation. It helps
reduce supplier uncertainty and enables the exchange of ideas to pool knowledge and
experience to tackle problems jointly. The benefits are mutual. The contractor
understands the supplier's capabilities and constraints better. The supplier gains a clearer
perspective of the requirements and insight into what contractor values most. It also gives
the supplier guidance in making competency-enhancing investments that aid its strategic
positioning for future. A supplier will generally be more likely to invest resources and
expend effort to pursue innovation when the contractor's technological targets are better
defined.
Good communication can also lead to greater trust between the parties and when
companies trust one another they can eliminate costly audit mechanisms, increasing the
efficiency and value in their interactions. Research on U.S., Japanese, and Korean
automakers found that high levels of trust in the supplier leads automakers to spend
significantly less time working on unproductive, transaction-oriented issues [6]. The
research found that better communication improved purchasing agents' efficiency,
managing on average more than twice the volume of goods. Instead of just pursuing
greater data exchange, the literature points out that companies should improve
communication that builds trust.
2.1.2 Contract Structure
Contractors can also incentivize innovation using contracts. The contractor faces a
number of options regarding contract terms, length, and number of sources. A variety of
factors must be utilized to determine optimal contract structure. These include the degree
of competition, the knowledge content and technological maturity of the item, the rate of
technological change, and transaction costs. In cases of intense competition, the nature of
supplier relationships may be inconsequential compared to market forces driving
innovation. As mentioned previously, however, it may also be advantageous to
intentionally limit competition by committing to a select number of sources, which can
improve coordination and encourage investment in non-contractual assets. In the case of
technologically mature items with minimal new knowledge content, room for innovation
may be small and an arms-length, competitive approach may be best.
Transaction costs can be minimized by reducing the number of sources, keeping
the contract terms simple, and by avoiding frequent negotiations. The contractor should
carefully consider the market situation described above before making decisions
regarding the contract variables within its control. Long-term contracts can be used to
encourage innovation; the prices can be agreed upon for several years in advance
avoiding costly re-negotiations. A predictable long-term demand can incentivize
suppliers to invest in innovative ideas even when they might have a lengthy payback
period. The contractor might not experience the cost reductions associated with supplier
innovation immediately; however, the renegotiation price at a future date may be much
lower than if these innovations had never occurred. The supplier gets to keep some
surplus by reducing costs below the contract price and the contractor, potentially, benefits
from a lower price upon eventual contract renegotiation, as shown in figure 2.1 below. In
a study describing how Chrysler transformed its supply chain [3], maintains that the key
to transforming suppliers into true partners is establishing means to incentivize suppliers
to participate in "expanding the pie". However, sharing the pie depends on the
contractor's ability to audit or estimate the supplier costs.
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Figure 2.1. Long-Term Contracts and Pricing
On the negative side, long-term contracts may reduce the competition-induced
incentive to innovate. They may also lock a contractor into a particular supplier and
design. To avoid these negative consequences, Japanese companies often engage in
simultaneous long-term commitments with two or three suppliers. This provides
partnership, competition and flexibility because the percentage of the total contract each
supplier receives is performance dependent [7]. In the satellite industry, however, dual
sourcing is often not a viable option. Due to low volume, part complexity, and
specialization it may not be economical to have more than one supplier. Oftentimes, there
are few alternative sources possessing the necessary capabilities, and switching costs are
high. And when alternative sources do exist, suppliers potentially agree to ambitious cost
or performance targets in exchange for becoming the sole source for years ahead. When a
supplier is the only available source, however, it is virtually guaranteed of future
business. And thus, long-term contract with that supplier may not be feasible. If at all, a
long-term contract would essentially just involve agreeing on prices for several years in
advance rather than doing so frequently.
The two simplest and most common contract types are fixed-price and cost-plus
contracts. In the former, the contractor negotiates a firm price at which it will procure the
item. In the latter, the supplier receives some fixed percentage profit on top of its reported
cost for producing the item. Fixed price contracts generally provide greater incentive for
innovation from the standpoint that suppliers can make additional profits by reducing
costs. Nevertheless, cost-plus contracts have other advantages and are also used
frequently, particularly in design and development phases of projects. Due to the
uncertainty involved with developing complex new technology, suppliers under fixed
price contracts may charge extremely high prices to compensate for risk. They would also
be prone to choose the least risk technology solutions, rather than pursue innovative new
possibilities. Therefore, the contractor may opt for cost-plus contracts coupled with close
monitoring of the suppliers' costs.
2.2 Potential Industry Earnings (PIE)
Every industry is part of a value chain: the chain from raw materials to the final customer
[8]. Figure 2.2 illustrates a 3-tier value chain. All participants in the value chain
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Figure 2.2. An Illustrative Value Chain
contribute to the final value it creates. Each participant would like to maximize this value,
and their share therein. An industry analysis identifies the factors that determine how
much value is created and how it is divided. Figure 2.3 below illustrates PIE using
demand-cost curves.
Figure 2.3. Potential Industry Earnings in a Simple Value Chain
The demand curve represents the buyer's willingness to pay for the incumbent
firms' products. The line with label "opportunity cost of resources" represents the
industry cost curve. Potential industry earnings (PIE) is the total value created minus the
opportunity cost of resources required to produce that value, or the area defined by the
industry demand and opportunity cost curves. The word "potential" is used as a modifier
because an industry can rarely capture all its value.
A change in industry demand or opportunity cost of resources affects the size of
the PIE. Figure 2.4 summarizes some forces that can make PIE larger. On a similar note,
PIE can become smaller as well: increase in the raw material prices can lead to higher
cost of resources.
Figure 2.4. Forces that Increase Potential Industrial Earnings (PIE)
Our interest is in the dividing that PIE. Porter [9] identified four forces that
determine how PIE is allocated within the value chain: competition, entry, buyer power,
and supplier power. In this study we are specifically interested in vertical PIE division: a
division between the buyers and suppliers. To isolate the effect of vertical division we
will assume "competition" and "entry" as constant and having no impact on the PIE in
the value chain.
If the supplying industry is intensely competitive, no firm in it can exert supplier
power. Another way to think about this is to ask how easily a contractor could buy input
from another supplier if the current supplier raises price. Most commodity products, such
as copper, steel, and so on, are fairly homogenous, and contractors can easily switch
supplier. Here what matters is relative strength of an individual supplier to an individual
contractor. Suppliers and contractors acting as a group, however, change the market
dynamic in the group or consortium's favor.
2.3 Kraljic's Purchasing Portfolio Model
In his seminal paper "Purchasing must become supply management" [10], Kraljic laid out
a diagnostic and strategic framework for supply management. The diagnosis uses the
following five exploratory supply questions: -
1. Are all the company divisions making a concerted effort to take advantage of
opportunities?
2. Are the bottlenecks and interruptions avoidable?
3. What is the risk tolerance?
4. What are the make-or-buy policies to get a good balance between cost and flexibility?
5. How much co-operation with suppliers or competitors is best to capitalize on shared
resources?
Kraljic lays out supply strategy using a four-phase approach. First, Kraljic offers
classification criteria for purchasing material requirements, figure 2.5 lists an adaptation
of this criteria. A company classifies its purchased materials in terms of profit impact and
supply risk. A material's strategic category can change subject to change in demand and
supply patterns. The supply decisions of the strategic items needs to be made using a
variety of analytic techniques which include market analysis, risk analysis, simulation
and optimization models, price forecasting, and other supporting microeconomic
analysis.
Accurate demand forecasting.
Detailed market research.
Development of long-term
supply relationships. Make-or-
buy decisions. Contract
staggering. Risk analysis.
Contingency planning.
Highly detailed market
data. Long-term supply
and demand trend
information. Good
competitive
intelligence. Industry
cost curves.
Bottleneck Volume insurance (at cost Medium-term supply Higher level
Items premium if necessary). Control demand forecasts. Very (e.g.,
of vendors. Backup plans. good market data. department
heads).
Leverage Exploitation of full purchasing Short-to-medium-term Medium
Items power. Vendor selection. demand planning. Good level (e.g.,
Targeted pricing market data. Accurate chief
strategies/negotiations. vendor data. Price rate buyer).
Contract/spot purchasing mix. forecasts.
Order volume optimization.
Noncritical Product standardization. Order Good market overview. Lower level
Items volume optimization. Efficient Short-term demand (e.g.,
processing. forecasts. buyers).
Figure 2.5. Classifying Purchasing Material Requirements (adapted from Kraljic, 1983)
Strategic
Items
Top level
(e.g., vice
president,
purchasing).
After classification, a company reviews the supply market. It assesses relative
strength of existing vendors, and the availability of strategic materials. The company
follows this up with evaluation of its material requirements and its ability to get desirable
supply terms. Next, the company evaluates the strategic items, identified in phase one, in
the purchasing portfolio matrix (see figure 2.6.)
Strategic Exploi
Balance
No-J
Low - Supply Market Strength High
Figure 2.6. The Purchasing Portfolio Matrix (adapted from Kraijic, 1983)
When the company has a dominant market position, the best strategy is
exploitation. Under low supply risk, this strategy provides the best profits. On the
contrary, when the suppliers are strong, diversification is the best option. It calls for
increased spending on market research, and the possibility of backward integration.
"Balance" refers to a well-balanced intermediate strategy.
Finally, in the short term, for the strategic items where the supplier's strength is
greater than a company's and the prescribed strategy is diversification, the company
should strengthen its position by consolidating volume in a single supplier and, if
possible, using supply contracts. However, to reduce long-term supply risk, the company
should search for alternative suppliers or consider vertical integration. On the other hand,
if the company is in a dominant position it can spread volume over suppliers, and
increase spot purchases.
The fundamental assumption of portfolio models seems to be that differences in
power and dependence between buyers and suppliers exist [11]. The general idea of
Kraljic's model is to minimize supply risk and make the most of buying power. Still, little
is known about how these concepts influence the choice for a specific purchasing
strategy. We needed to gain a better understanding of how purchasing portfolio models
are being used in practice and how they could be used by purchasing professionals in
order to pursue effective differentiated purchasing strategies. This paper, using data from
a comprehensive survey among Dutch purchasing professionals, empirically quantifies
'relative power' and 'total interdependence' for a number of portfolio-based purchasing
strategies. The research findings indicate that there is no simple, standardized blue print
for the application of the portfolio analysis. It requires reflecting on results, critical
thinking and sophistication of purchasing management.
2.4 Power Perspective in Supply Management
A focus on buyer and supplier power is essential for a good understanding of the
circumstances that a firm faces [12]. Further, it is important to understand the variables
that increase or diminish this power. Cox uses economic theory, buyer's position is best
defended by maintaining perfectly competitive supply markets, to argue that buyer
supplier relations are inherently conflictual. And thus, any buyer supplier collaboration
will come with some undertone of tension. Cox reminds that money is the reason
organizations engage in an exchange relationship. The buyer and supplier choices are
made based on the value each will be able to appropriate. Tension, thus, arises from the
interest in expanding the organizational share of the PIE, as is laid out in PIE Framework,
section 2.2 above. Cox cautions that there can be no "best practice" way of conducting
buyer-supplier relationship or the exchange relationship. This relation is subject to the
dynamic choices that these players make. Further, best relationship approach is a time-
bound variable of uncertainty in circumstances. Only by understanding the resources that
enhance and diminish the relative power of buyers and suppliers in specific exchange
relationships is it possible to know the best relationship management approach.
Power defines business-to-business relationship [13]. Buying and selling are two
key business competencies. On the downstream side, suppliers can obtain leverage by
closing the market to competitors and by creating an information advantage over the
buyers. In absence of such advantages, a supplier should seek short-term opportunities to
win market-share through constant innovation or should look for opportunities to create
market closure through merger and acquisition activities. On the upstream side, when the
organizations are thinking about supply competence, they should use make-buy decision
to augment their power. A robust make-buy methodology necessitates a good
understanding of pre- and post-contractual power in buyer and supplier relationships. The
Power Matrix, figure 2.7 below, outlines a framework to understand and interpret this
power relationship.
BUYER INTERDEPENDENCE
DOMINANCE
INDEPENDENCE SUPPLIER
0 DOMINANCE
LOW
LOW HIAH
Figure 2.7. The Power Matrix (Cox, 2001)
The matrix bases the buyer-supplier relation on the relative utility and relative
scarcity of resources shared between the two parties. In the buyer dominance box, the key
criteria to evaluate the supplier are cost improvement and quality; the supplier sells at or
near the marginal cost. In the interdependence box, both, the buyer and the supplier, need
to work closely in an engaged manner because both have competencies that the other
require; it is the co-innovation and profit-sharing quadrant. In independence box, the
buyer and the supplier lack the reasons to co-innovate and there is no additional value in
collaboration. And in the last, supplier dominance box, supplier has all the levers of
power.
The key to supply competence lies in a firm's ability to figure out its correct
position in The Power Matrix and in ability to find ways to move to a more favorable
position. Figure 2.8 below provides some key attributes to consider while positioning
buyer and supplier relationship using The Power Matrix.
* Few buyers/many suppliers
a Buyer has high % share of total
market for supplier
SSupplier is highly dependent on
buyer for revenue with limited
alternatives
SSupplier switching costs are high
* Buyers switching costs are low
* Buyers account is attractive to
supplier
a Supplier offerings are commoditised
and standardised
SBuyer search costs are low
a Supplier has no information
asymmetry advantages over buyer
a Few buyers/few suppliers
SBuyer has relatively high % share of
total market for supplier
a Supplier is highly dependent on
buyer for revenue with few
alternatives
* Suppliers switching costs are high
• Buyer switching costs are high
* Buyers account is attractive to
supplier
a Supplier offerings are not
commoditised and customised
SBuyer search costs are high
Supplier has significant information
asymmetry advantages over buyer
-1- I- NW
-Many buyers/many suppliers
* Buyer has relatively low % share of
total market for supplier
* Supplier is not dpendet on buyer
for revenue and has many alternatives
U Supplier's switching costs are low
* Buyer's switching costs are low
SBuyer's account is not particularly
attractive to supplier
* Supplier offerings are commoditised
and standardised
* Buyer search costs am relatively low
o Supplier has only limited infomation
asymmetry advantage over buyer
Low
* Many buyers/few suppliers
* Buyer has low % share of total
market for supplier
SSupplier is not at all dependent on the
buyer for revenue and has many
alternatives
* Supplier switching costs are low
* Buyer switching costs are high
, Buyers account is not attractive to the
supplier
* Supplier offerings are not
commoditised and customised
* Buyer search costs are very high
Supplier has high information
asymmetry advantages over buyer
High
Figure 2.8. The Attributes of Buyer and Supplier Power (Cox, 2001)
The buyer dominance box is the ideal position for a buyer. Specifically, the buyer
supply competence should seek ways to eradicate "isolating mechanisms" that build
supplier power and ensure that the supplier market is always highly contested; that way
the buyers can ensure that the suppliers receive only normal returns.
Both the Kraljic and the Cox approaches are equivalent. An item is strategic or
bottleneck subject to supply landscape. And a supplier is dominant subject to a particular
item.
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3 Industry Background
Aerospace, and the commercial satellite systems therein, is a high technology industry
engaged primarily in the production of aircraft, missiles, and space systems. Satellite
manufacturing, rocket manufacturing, launch services comprise the three space systems
sub-segments. In the U.S., the satellite manufacturing sub-segment is dominated by
Boeing's satellite systems division and Lockheed Martin's space systems segment. In
Europe, Alcatel and Astrium, an EADS subsidiary, are the big players.
Figure 3.1 provides the hierarchical view of the aerospace industry and figure 3.2
lists out a limited view of space systems industry.
Aerospace
Aeronautics Missile Space
Systems Systems
Aircrafts Ground Spacecrafts Satellites Launch Ground
Equipment Vehicles Equipment
Figure 3.1. The Aerospace Industry
Commercial
Space Systems
Launch Satellites Ground
VehiclesI Equipment
Figure 3.2. Commercial Space Systems
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) forms the backdrop of the
industry. ITAR regulates US contractors, for example, Lockheed is precluded from
competing in many business opportunities outside of the US. ITAR issues limit
outsourcing to foreign suppliers. Regulation also limits vertical integration between
contractors and suppliers that can lead to captive capacity, because sometimes the
suppliers are required to be able to work with various contractors (rather than just one.)
Entry barriers in the satellite industry are quite high in terms of technology and
technical know-how. A satellite is arguably one of the most complex and technologically
sophisticated products that can be produced by any industry, requiring a command of a
wide array of technologies, production processes, organizational structures, and supplier
networks. All players in this industry have operated over a long period time and have
developed unique resources and capabilities that are difficult to imitate. For these
reasons, the entry barriers are very high for the satellite systems industry. Thus, it is very
difficult for new entrants to enter. Most often, the new entrants are government-
sponsored companies. Government sponsored space programs are usually strategic rather
than competitive in nature. Over the time these government-sponsored programs build a
supply capacity that is then made available to the outside competitive market. This is one
way some of the suppliers enter the market. This trend is especially visible in China and
Japan, where the national governments have pushed hard to enter aerospace industry. All
in all, governments play a major role in the satellite industry. The lingering presence of
state governments in the ownership structure of EADS (European Aeronautic, Defense
and Space Company) and the more participatory nature of many European governments
in industrial policy may indirectly impact industry independence and flexibility, and
influence its responsiveness to market conditions.
Suppliers in this industry are very specialized due to the high technology content of
their products and services, which must be designed and produced to exacting
requirements and quality specifications. Unlike the case in many industries in the
commercial sector, it is very difficult to switch suppliers due to extremely high re-
qualification costs and asset-specificity involving high investment costs that are not
transferable [14].
Another key feature of the industry is the offsets. Offsets are concessions where,
in the event of an overseas procurement, the contractor compensates the purchasing
country, or the customer, for a perceived loss to the economy. Offsets are mostly required
for sales to foreign governments; more than 150 countries have offset policies. Offset
costs (to contractors) range from about 2% to 5% or even more in some areas; i.e. at 3%,
$30M is budgeted for offset for each $1B of contract value. U.S. does not have a formal
offset policy. Most countries have formal offset policies, including almost all U.S. trading
partners. Some offset arrangements that also require the transfer of technology to foreign
firms can potentially change the supplier landscape [15]. Such offset agreements should
be considered strategically as a change in supplier landscape is of immense interest to the
subcontract managers evaluating and negotiating LTAs. The offsets can work to a
contractor's advantage as well. For example, in one arrangement Lockheed was forced to
take on a new role of improving foreign suppliers because of pressure from their
customers. Lockheed spent a significant amount of time, money and effort over a decade
to increase their ability to work with international suppliers. Lockheed has received a
major payback from this process. This international exposure has made them more
attractive to other customers and thus boosted their edge in the highly competitive space
systems market.
4 Overview of Satellite Demand and Configuration
A satellite is a very complex and a highly engineered system which costs in excess of
hundred million dollars to make. A satellite lasts about 15 years and satellite delivery
lead time is about 30 months. The annual satellite demand, commercial and non-
commercial, is about a hundred. Figure 4.1 below lists out historical and forecasted
figures for all kinds of satellites launches from 1995 to 2014; about 25 to 30 percent of
this demand is in the commercial sector. The satellite demand comes from the
government and commercial customers, e.g. defense, broadcasting, telecom, and
broadband data services companies. During a satellite's lifetime, product reliability is the
key quality criterion. Any reliability issue can lead to loss of trust, loss of future business,
and order cancellations. In November 2002, PanAmSat cancelled an order it had placed
with Boeing Satellite Systems for a BSS-702. The cancellation was due to concern about
solar array power problems in some in-orbit BSS-702s. Boeing was no longer using the
same reflectors on new BSS-702s but the degree of confidence in the BSS-702 had been
lost [16].
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Figure 4.1. Annual Satellite Launch Numbers
For Lockheed, a satellite integrator and manufacturer, a satellite is an assembly of
the following three part types - in-house manufacturing, commodities, and subcontract
parts. See figure 4.2 for an illustrative view of satellite part types -
Figure 4.2. Satellite Assembly
Lockheed, and likewise most contractors, build some satellite parts in-house. The
in-house manufactured parts are similar to the subcontract parts except that they are not
outsourced. The in-house manufacturing is a legacy capacity that is carried on due to
efficient manufacturing capability. This also works as a negotiating lever with the
suppliers.
Commodities are high volume and low cost items that contractors buy in bulk from
suppliers. Oftentimes, contractors have corporate level agreements to cover commodity
purchases, the annual agreements are known as general pricing agreements (GPAs).
Commodities usually have a shorter procurement lead-time than the subcontract parts.
Subcontract items are a part of satellite that contractors outsource, or subcontract, to
suppliers. These suppliers are also called subcontractors. The subcontract items are low
volume and high costs items. A typical subcontract part costs anywhere between
$250,000 and $3 million dollars. Satellite subcontract parts make up about 60% of the
satellite costs. Essentially, subcontract item costs makes up majority of satellite cost and
contractors have high stake in keeping these costs low. Satellite subcontract part
examples: Receivers, Command Receivers, Earth Sensors, Sun Sensors, Antennas,
Reflectors, Beacons, Structures, Harness Assemblies, Cabling, Switch-bank Assemblies,
Converters, TWT (traveling wave tube). Each of these subcontract parts have a delivery
lead time in the range of four to twelve months.
5 Satellite Systems' Supply Chain
The satellite systems supply chain comprises three key parties - customers, contractors,
and suppliers. Customers develop requirements and submit requests for proposal to
contractors. Contractors prepare the bids. These bids are cost and delivery estimates. The
costs are obtained from LTAs, in-house manufacturing, and GPAs. If an LTA is not
available, the contractor sends out bids to qualified suppliers for subcontract items. The
supplier responses feed into the final bid that the contractor makes to the customer.
Contractors reply with bids; the contractors mostly bid by themselves but sometimes the
contractors form a consortium with other contractors and suppliers, leveraging different
strengths. Finally, the customer awards the bid and the contractor builds to design. Figure
5.1 below illustrates satellite systems supply chain inter-relationships and flow.
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Figure 5.1. Key Supply Chain Layers and Activities
5.1 Key Partners
5.1.1 Customers
Satellite customers can be broadly divided into two categories - government, and
commercial. The government customer often comes with a variety of restrictions. For
example, the contractor may not be allowed to subcontract outside of the country, the
technology and order information may be classified. The government customer may limit
its business to specific contractors rather having an open market bid for the satellite
projects. A lot of the above may not apply to the commercial customer. However,
governments restrict the capability of the satellites available to the commercial customer,
and the entities to whom these satellites can be sold. The commercial customer is a non-
U.S. government customer like a foreign government, or a broadcasting and a
communication company. The commercial satellites are standard satellites and thus the
concept and prototyping steps in the supply chain are skipped: the contractors bid to
customer's specification and, subject to some negotiations, are awarded bids to
manufacture. In case of foreign government orders, offsets may play a significant role in
the bid award.
5.1.2 Contractors
The contractor is a systems integrator at the top of the space systems manufacturing value
chain. The satellite systems business is dominated by a handful of large aerospace
manufacturers or contractors - Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Boeing,
and EADS Astrium. Northrop and Raytheon are largely government contractors.
Lockheed, Boeing and EADS have a good footprint in both the government and the
commercial sector.
Lockheed has undertaken a whole range of supplier management actions, such as
collaborating closely with their suppliers, building long-term relationships, and
improving suppliers. Applying these principles while internationalizing the supplier base
leads to a situation in which the company ends up working to help improve firms that are
or will be their competitors.
5.1.3 Suppliers
Satellite suppliers supply one or more subcontract parts. These suppliers are mostly
located in the US, Europe, and Japan. Here is list of a few suppliers along-with the parts
they supply: EADS Astrium, Thales Group, SAAB Space (acquired by RUAG), NEC,
MELCO (Mitsubishi Electric Corporation), L-3 Communications, ATK, Applied
Aerospace, Vanguard, General Electric Aircraft Engines (GEAE), Rolls-Royce,
Honeywell and Pratt & Whitney. Some of these suppliers, like EADS Astrium, and
Thales Group are competitors as well. These suppliers are also called Tier-i suppliers,
since they are important to and directly contribute to the operations of the contractors.
Further upstream, there are the tier-2 and tier-3 suppliers who provide fairly
commoditized products to the tier-I suppliers.
5.2 Order Management Process
Customers send request for proposal (RFP) and design specifications to contractors. The
contractors estimate the cost to build to this specification. This cost estimation takes input
from commodity price contracts, in-house manufacturing cost estimates, and supplier
subcontract item prices. The subcontract item prices are available in the LTA
documentation. However, Lockheed does not have LTAs for all subcontract parts. The
cost estimate for subcontract parts for which LTAs are not available is done using RFP
process. Lockheed sends out RFPs to the prospective suppliers. The supplier bid
responses are evaluated and bids are awarded to suppliers which are binding on Lockheed
and suppliers subject to Lockheed winning the customer contract. After Lockheed has a
complete cost estimate, Lockheed replies to the customer RFP. The bid process may
differ between commercial and government satellite supply chains. The government
supply chain has some additional steps like product concept, and prototype to
specification that are not required in the commercial satellite. A contractor may prototype
to specification and, subsequently, demonstrate that prototype if it is a government
customer.
Associated with the satellite bid proposals is the process of supplier selection.
This selection depends on the following factors -
1. LTA: when Lockheed has LTA for a certain subcontract part with a supplier it is
obligated to use that supplier. In such a case, supplier bid process is not used, instead
the LTA supplier is contacted for supply commitment and locked in LTA prices are
used to do cost estimation. LTAs ensure quality supply and controlled sourcing costs
even in times of high demand.
2. Price: other than LTA, supplier bid price is the main criterion used to select a
supplier. Note that supplier bidding is done only in the absence of an LTA supplier or
when an LTA supplier is unable to meet the delivery schedule or capacity
requirements.
3. Customer: sometimes customers may demand specific suppliers. For example, for
KU-bands, a customer might want Lockheed to go to Thales only and not to L3 or
any other supplier even if there is some cost benefit. Lockheed may make a pitch
about another supplier, the customer may consider it or reject it despite that cost
differential.
4. Regulation: satellite Systems is a heavily regulated industry. The government may not
allow certain suppliers.
5. Schedule: supplier's ability to meet the delivery schedule, along-with cost and
quality, is the key criterion to award a bid to a supplier. An average subcontract item
delivery lead time is about four to fourteen months. Oftentimes, to meet the schedule
requirements an order may be split as well. Say for Harness Assemblies, the order
may be split between two suppliers - one providing the payload, and the other
providing bus and propulsion.
If Lockheed wins the contract, it builds to the design specification. It is a 26 to 30
month process which involves in-house manufacturing and sourcing, which is a
combination of sourcing subcontract items, sourcing from subcontract suppliers under
agreed upon prices, and sourcing commodities. The suppliers similarly involve their
suppliers, called Tier-2 suppliers, in this process. Lockheed sends suppliers a detailed and
exact specification, it is more detailed than the one used during the bid process. During
the satellite manufacturing process there may be a change request from the customer.
Such a request can lead to change in prices if the changes are significant or affect design.
If the change request affects a subcontract part, Lockheed passes on the design changes to
the supplier. Lockheed can cancel supplier delivery by making partial payment
(applicable till that stage); supplier payments are usually made in installments beginning
purchase order signing date.
5.3 Distinguishing Features of the Supply Chain
1. Design to specification: each satellite is a unique product; each satellite is designed to
manufacture. Subcontract parts like structures cannot be ordered until about four
months into the satellite manufacture because the design is not fixed until then.
Similarly, most satellite subcontract parts are design sensitive and have to be ordered
during the manufacturing process. This affects and shapes the supply chain design.
2. No maintenance and repair of the hardware: satellite hardware, once it is launched, is
not accessible for repair. And thus, a lot of spare capacity is built to fail-proof a
satellite. This extra capacity, like extra reflectors, adds costs to an already expensive
satellite.
3. Very high switching costs: switching costs are the costs that are associated with
changing to another supplier. This element has an immediate and direct cost, that of
searching for new suppliers and qualifying them but also indirect costs that include
the costs related with training the supplier and reaching a relationship of a desired
level. Switching costs are relatively high due to the costs that relate to developing the
relationship and integrating operations. Generally, it is difficult to change a supplier
with whom the company has close relationship and shares information and
proprietary knowledge.
4. Very long lead-time: because a satellite is designed and manufactured to
specification, like pointed out above, and because each subcontract part has a long
sourcing lead time, the overall satellite delivery lead time - time required for sourcing
and assembly - becomes very long. On an average, a satellite is manufactured in a
time window of about two to two and a half years.
5. Small supplier base: the satellite supply management practices are additionally
shaped by a small number of suppliers located in certain geo-political landscape.
6. Regulatory restrictions: in addition to the supplier selection and industry regulations
listed in sections 5.2 and 3 respectively, there are logistical barriers, such as
government certification requirements, that are both costly and time consuming for
the contractor. The different configurations of major components need regulatory
certification.
7. Low cost sourcing trend also shapes the supply chain. Contractors are trying to find
their way through low cost countries, mainly in Eastern Europe and in Asia.
Outsourced manufacturing for satellites provides companies with access to cheaper
but high quality parts and assemblies. This practice also enables access to government
projects in those countries. The structure of satellite supply chains, however, is
influenced more by the non-US governments (customers) than by the need to source
from the lowest cost suppliers. The non-US government orders are often awarded
with conditions like transferring manufacturing and technology to the ordering
country.
5.4 Strategic Supply Management
A key characteristic of the space system supply chains is the sheer complexity of today's
satellite. A satellite is a highly engineered, high value, low tolerance to risks product. The
final satellite assemblers rely on suppliers to build and integrate considerably complex
assemblies. Supplier management in the space industry therefore takes on additional
importance in terms of cost competitiveness and the quality and performance of the final
product. The satellite systems industry contractors such as Lockheed have to respond
(looking downstream in the supply chain) to the supplier management efforts of their
major customers and (looking upstream) manage extensive supplier networks of their
own. The Lockheed suppliers are totally responsible for the product quality and are
responsible to manage and improve the quality of lower tiers.
Suppliers manufacture one or more subcontract items. These suppliers are spread
across geographies, especially, the US, Europe, and Japan. The supplier base for most
satellite parts is usually small. Usually, this supplier base is restricted one to three
suppliers. Sometimes there is only one qualified subcontractor in the market; a qualified
subcontractor is a contractor certified and trusted supplier. Product complexity, strict
quality and regulatory standards, and very high capital requirements ensure that this
equation does not change very often. The very high upfront capital investments and
knowledge barriers make it a difficult market to enter. And thus it is rare for an
independent supplier to enter the market. The small supplier base and component
criticality drives high channel collaboration in this industry. Contractors use LTAs or
competitive bidding to source subcontract parts that are supplied by two or more
suppliers. This is not possible when a single monopoly supplier supplies a part; the
monopoly suppliers use their bargaining power and charge a high price. Lack of supplier
diversity is not very favorable to the contractors who, along-with governments, often take
steps to change a single supplier landscape. Sometimes, the contractors also keep some
in-house manufacturing capacity primarily to use it as a bargaining tool to reduce the
supplier power. Contractors can also push their suppliers because they have market
power and better access to capital.
5.4.1 Long-Term Agreements (LTA)
The satellite supply chain supplier landscape hardly changes (because national interests
prevent companies from failing.) Thus, supplier relations become key to manage
sourcing. Complexity and competition drive this contractor supplier relationship.
Competitive bidding is often the sourcing strategy. And, a lot often, contractors and
suppliers get into long-term agreements to better collaborate. Section 6 expands on LTAs.
5.4.2 Single Source Supplier
A single-supplier is not a stable supplier landscape. Such a market composition is
considered very risky that Lockheed, or other contractor, and government work together,
or on their own, to avoid. A monopoly supplier comes with two risks -
1. Supply risk: a monopoly supplier may not be able to supply a part due to capacity or
strategic reasons. Further, any risk to a monopoly supplier's manufacturing capacity
can significantly delay a satellite. Recently, a single source Italian supplier's
manufacturing facility was affected by earthquake and that put pressure on
Lockheed's delivery and build schedule.
2. Price risk: a monopoly supplier can charge a price that is non-competitive and thus
reduce the chances of Lockheed's winning a customer contract.
Lockheed sometimes finds itself in single-source relationships with suppliers.
These relationships are problematic and costly. These situations occur because there are
no other suppliers with the necessary capabilities, or because developing, qualifying, and
maintaining more than one source for complex, low volume components or subsystems
would be equally costly. As a result, Lockheed becomes highly dependent on these
suppliers. When they perform poorly, Lockheed's only option is to spend more money to
help them. This often involves sending engineering teams to these suppliers to help them
improve their processes, which consumes considerable amounts of resources and time.
Although considerable collaboration occurs between Lockheed and such suppliers, the
relationships are not often characterized by trust-based partnerships. If Lockheed requires
design modifications later in a contract, single-source suppliers tend to charge extremely
high rates to make the changes [2].
5.4.3 Qualifying a Supplier
This applies to non-qualified suppliers. A non-qualified supplier is a supplier that has
subcontract part manufacturing capability but with whom Lockheed has never
subcontracted. It is costly to qualify a new supplier. Each of the supplier processes has to
be audited and certified. The cost for qualification differs from supplier to supplier and
can go up-to $200,000 or more. At suppliers request or on its own Lockheed may send
the supplier an estimate of the on-boarding or qualification cost. This cost may be shared
between Lockheed and the supplier, or either party may choose to fund the qualification
subject to its strategic needs: supplier because it wants to do business with Lockheed;
Lockheed because it is in its strategic interest (for example, due issues with the current
supplier or due to other supply and price risks.) A government's strategic decision may
also lead to a decision to qualify a new supplier - such a decision is usually supported by
government funding as well. A supplier is evaluated using a qualification method. A
supplier can be evaluated using the following criteria: engineering know-how, financially
stability, on-orbit history, currency, capacity, part specification, government approval
(banned countries list), and ITAR information - whether the hardware is ITAR
controlled.
5.4.4 Developing a New Supplier
It is developing supply capacity from bottom up. It is more like growing in-house
manufacturing capacity. It is rare but if a strategic need arise Lockheed may choose to
develop a new government sponsored, or a joint venture, supply capacity. It takes years
to develop a new supplier and to get it up to speed.
6 Long-Term Agreements (LTA)
Contractors try to secure their supply for the life of the project but they also don't want to
create a completely captive, vertically integrated supply chain for the fear of conflict of
interest and loss of demand aggregation. Lockheed uses LTAs to better manage its
subcontract part supply. These contracts are used to secure supply for a long term while
simplifying the contractor supplier communication.
LTAs help avoid the costly and time consuming bid process every time a
customer order is taken. Historically prices don't go down and thus it is better to lock
them as low as you can. This industry sees no real economies of scale. So, quantity does
not become a factor in the contracting process; that makes contracting easier because
complex forecasting is not required, a general guidance is good enough. Lockheed did
not have subcontracting until mid-90s. At Lockheed, LTAs are the responsibility of an
individual subcontract manager. A subcontract manager works out a contract proposal
and then involves the engineering and quality team. Finally, the LTA proposal is taken to
management for approval and an agreement is worked out. An LTA can be based on an
existing order or it can be an independent process triggered by anticipated demand.
6.1 LTA Features
An LTA is an agreement for a specific subcontract part. LTAs specify price, quantity,
terms and conditions, renegotiation terms, and currency terms. Some LTAs have
quantities specified (usually maximum) while some don't. Lockheed uses the supplier as
'sole source', as long as the LTA supplier can fulfill the subcontract part demand. LTAs
also list a payment schedule. Lockheed can exit an order-in-execution under LTA at
different times with partial payments (payments applicable till that stage). These LTAs
are written with price variations in mind. The supplier can renegotiate any significant raw
material price changes. Additionally, the LTAs are written taking currency fluctuations
into account. Currency fluctuations are managed by changing the dollar price such that
the foreign currency price stays firm (so that the current price in foreign currency is close
to the LTA price in foreign currency at the time of writing the LTA.)
LTAs are about two-years long contracts. These LTAs can be renewed at the end
of terms if both parties agree. LTAs are re-negotiable and terminable. In that sense, these
are very flexible contracts that make business easy by providing a ready and mutually
agreed structure and rules of engagement.
6.2 LTA Feasibility
It is difficult to predict demand and prices over the LTA time period. If the business does
not have a good understanding of satellite demand and supply, LTAs are likely to be very
inaccurate and can lead to unexpected loss or gain. Economic cycle data and price
forecasts of raw materials are necessary to make informed LTA decisions.
Budget, performance, schedule pressure, and technological obsolescence can lead
to design changes in a satellite. LTAs are not always possible due to such part design
changes. These changes may require a lot of rework which can lead to significant change
in cost and thus make the LTA prices irrelevant. Often, LTA advantages may not be
realized because of implementation issues. In fact, multiplicity of change requests can
strain contractor supplier relationship.
Lockheed's experience on LTAs for complex subassemblies has been mixed.
Lockheed at one time had LTA for harness assemblies but that did not work out well
because of too many design changes, the LTA was not implementable. And thus, for
some parts, like harness assemblies, Lockheed does not expect LTAs. But on the other
hand, even in difficult assemblies (that have frequent design changes) history can be used
to craft LTA in such a manner that the likely changes are appropriately documented or
provided for in certain clauses. For example, Lockheed has LTAs for 30-something
variations of reflectors (reflectors are a part of antenna structure and have a twelve to
twenty four month delivery lead time). For structures (twelve month lead time) LTA
Lockheed specifies the baseline, and then builds additions or changes into the cost during
order execution.
LTAs are unattractive when the supplier capability (financial, delivery
performance) is questionable. Also, single source suppliers (monopoly situation)
normally do not sign such agreements, since it does not provide them any benefit or
leverage.
6.3 LTA Risks
LTA is a mutually agreed and terminable at will agreement. Price fluctuations, currency
fluctuations, and design changes are the big risks to an LTA from a cost perspective. All
these situations can change the subcontract sourcing cost significantly and dent
Lockheed's margin on the satellite product. Historically, if the raw material prices rise
and suppliers feel pressure to deliver to contractors at the LTA price, they request
Lockheed to increase the price payable to meet that shortfall. Lockheed, subject to proper
case being made, would honor such requests.
6.3.1 Currency Fluctuations
The customer pays a fixed price per satellite. Lockheed prices its satellites based on cost
to manufacture. An increase in cost to manufacture is a significant risk to Lockheed's
profitability. Since LTA prices are used to estimate the cost to manufacture, any change
to these prices can potentially affect Lockheed's bottomline. Lockheed's suppliers,
however, demand additional payments when the currency exchange rate becomes
unfavorable to them. Lockheed pays suppliers using USD. The LTAs are also written
with dollar amounts as prices. And thus while Lockheed's payables for subcontract items
stay the same the supplier's receivables can swing with currency fluctuations. These
fluctuations can affect the supplier in the following manner: -
1. Supplier's currency appreciates against the contractor's currency - the supplier is
worse off as the accounts receivable from the contractor declines; LTA price becomes
less attractive to the supplier.
2. Supplier's currency depreciates against the contractor's currency - the supplier is
better off as the accounts receivable from the contractor increases; LTA price become
more attractive to the supplier.
Suppliers are concerned about their currency appreciating and thus affecting their
receivables. This is a risk for the suppliers to manage. However, Lockheed's experience
is that this is not true. In fact, severe currency changes lead to price changes. When the
supplier is better off, the LTA price is honored but when the supplier is worse off, the
supplier requests for a price plus an additional amount to make up for the loss. Lockheed
usually honor such requests. Since the price change cannot be passed onto customers,
Lockheed bottomline is affected. The satellite prices remain fixed downstream. Any
adjustment made to the supplier is made from the Lockheed's potential profits. These
currency fluctuations can be managed in the following three ways -
Manage by exception - this method suggests wait and watch. Rather than actively
managing currency risks, wait for the suppliers to request a payment for any losses
incurred due to currency fluctuations and then evaluate and approve or reject them. This
approach has three issues - 1) the suppliers are increasingly demanding currency cover
and may not agree to it or they may request a guaranteed approval for currency losses, 2)
Lockheed doesn't gain when the supplier currency depreciates, and 3) the currency risk is
managed but not avoided. And thus oftentimes, a subcontractor will end up sourcing a
part at higher than a budgeted price. Such a change impacts the satellite manufacturing
cost.
Normalized rates - another method of managing currency risks is by tying LTA price to
an exchange rate, X, and an exchange rate range, Y to Z. If the exchange rate goes above
or below this range, a price different than the LTA price is charged. This price is
normalized using the rates X, Y, and Z in the following manner. If the exchange rate stays
between X and Y, the LTA price is used; however, if the rate goes above Z or falls below
Y then multiply the LTA price with the following factor -
Z or Y divided by X
A variation of this method can be used to manage the currency risks. This approach is
similar to 'Manage by exception' except that Lockheed now stands to gain on supplier
currency depreciation.
Hedging - Industry, in general, manages currency risks by hedging. A lot of global
companies with global footprint avoid currency surprises by hedging. It is a potential
method to manage the currency risks to satellite subcontract agreements as well. A
significant benefit of hedging is that price variations are completely avoided. Of all the
three options listed here, contractor's cost of manufacturing a satellite is not impacted
only when hedging is used to manage currency fluctuations.
6.3.2 Commodity Price Fluctuations
A satellite requires a variety of scarce and expensive raw materials, e.g., titanium, and
composite materials. These materials may have a certain procurement risk and long lead
times. E.g. Russia is a major titanium producer and the lead-time for titanium forgings is
about twenty-six weeks [18]. A safe bet will be to keep a good safety stock but high raw
material costs make such a policy uneconomic. The supply chain design should account
for scarce raw materials. The contractors can secure more favorable prices by limiting its
supplier base and by directing the majority of supplier purchases to specific partners -
whether this is done under GPAs or under a consortium of satellite industry contractors
that's a moot point.
6.4 LTA Benefits
LTAs reduce ordering lead-time significantly by reducing information redundancy and,
potentially, provide channel cost savings by reducing the channel transaction costs. The
contractor benefits by having ready rates for the cost estimates to the customers and also
benefits by being able to source parts at costs lower than the spot market price.
Oftentimes, a contractor has to respond to a customer's request for proposal sooner than
supplier can provide the part price inputs. This increases the risk of contractor using an
incorrect price and subsequently, due to incorrect estimate, either loose an order or win it
at a loss. Having LTA prices handy avoids such order risks.
For a supplier, the most common benefit of an LTA include a long-term
commitment by the contractor, early involvement in product design and development,
and being selected as sole source supplier. Another notable benefit derived by these
suppliers is that they enjoy cost savings in purchasing raw materials by "piggy-backing"
on contractor General Pricing Agreements (GPA) involving large-volume discounts.
GPAs are agreements that Lockheed has with some commodity suppliers. Subcontractors
need to use Lockheed's GPAs. If some raw material is not part of the GPAs, Lockheed
can create a GPA list on suppliers request. This can lower the price. For example, the
price of harness assemblies can be reduced by five to fifteen percent using GPAs.
Practices like these give Lockheed a cost advantage by allowing the suppliers at all levels
the benefit of economies of scale. The suppliers can look forward to a long-term
relationship and make long-term investments in both process improvement and
technological innovation to reduce costs. These contractual practices set into motion a
new set of arrangements leading to mutually beneficial relationships throughout the
supplier network [17].
7 A Framework for Supply Management in Satellite Systems Industry
7.1 Supply Strategy Matrix
A satellite is a mature product and a commodity. The whole satellite value chain is a
bilateral monopoly: a few customers, a few contractors and a few suppliers. It is a market
with fierce competition, and high entry barriers across the supply chain. From the
contractor's strategic perspective, price is the differentiator to sell to the customers and
collaboration is the key to manage the suppliers.
All the subcontract parts that go into a satellite are critical parts. But while parts
as such are critical and necessary for a satellite, sometimes, part quantities may not be
critical. It may be all right to send a satellite with, say, twenty-five, rather than twenty-
seven, receivers into the orbit. Price and supply risk to the satellite subcontract parts are a
significant threat to stay competitive and to ensure delivery. A contractor has to excel on
these parameters to stay viable. And thus, the contractor goal becomes to better manage
supply risk and part prices. Technological improvement and quality are other parameters
to consider but with the maturity of the satellite product, and the guarantee of quality
from all the contractors, these are not differentiators. The technological improvements are
driven by the government side of the business and not by the commercial side.
The supply risk comes from factors like higher supplier power, and scarce supply
resources. It is a seesaw with supplier and contractor on either side. And thus, a higher
supplier power implies lower contractor power. The high supplier power can be because
of monopolistic supply landscape or because of technological advantages. Monopolistic
supply landscape can be further qualified by redefining it to include scarcity of domestic
versus foreign supply sources. A contractor can manage the supply risk by making
investments in vertical integration, in developing & qualifying new supplier, or in in-
house capacity. The supplier investments can also be made to mitigate technological risks
by encouraging the supplier to innovate. In this industry capital is not a source of supplier
power because on an average the contractors have more access to capital.
Satellite being a price sensitive product, the overall industry PIE for the contractor
and the supplier is fixed. A customer bid award to the contractor fixes a price and total
contractor and supplier PIE. Contractor's interest is to divide the PIE favorably. In-house
manufacturing - as a cheaper option or as a strategic tool to bargain better supplier prices,
spot market, and favorable LTAs are some of the strategies to split the PIE favorably.
LTAs should be used to increase margins when the part complexity is medium and
supplier power is low. This hinges on the contractor's ability to lock good LTA rates.
These rates can be determined using a variety of techniques, section 7.3 offers one
guiding framework to evaluate such rates. High part complexity comes with LTA
management overhead and LTA risks and thus such parts can be better managed using
collaborative spot market. Suppliers with high market power do not prefer to do LTAs.
Such suppliers leave spot market as the only engagement option. In terms of sharing the
PIE, this is not a favorable situation for the contractors. This market situation also comes
with high supply risk. And thus, contractors should take steps to move the suppliers from
high power to low power. These steps are primarily investments in the supply.
Contractors' ability to invest and supply risk avoidance ensures that the satellite supply
market is in a stable state only when the supplier power is low. LTA decisions are
affected by the supplier market power and by the inherent LTA risks listed in section 6.3.
The make buy decision for the subcontract parts can be weighed using the supply
risk and price strategy laid out above. If the in-house manufacturing provides cheaper
parts than the supplier then the contractors should make effort to utilize such
manufacturing. The in-house manufacturing capability, cheaper than sourcing or not, can
also be used as a lever to bargain better prices with the suppliers. However, any
investment in the in-house capacity has to be strategic and not tactical. Such a decision
should be made with long-term cost-benefits in mind. Figure 7.1 illustrates this supply
management strategy in a matrix. The lower left quadrant is the ideal position to be in for
it maximizes the PIE for the contractor. The best contractor strategy - investment in
supply, standardizing the parts - is to move the part-supplier combination to this
quadrant.
LTAs can be a win-win strategy for both the contractor and the supplier. A
supplier benefits even when the supplier is a monopoly, in the following manner: long-
term commitment, lower cost of project management, lower raw material costs using the
contractor's GPAs, and reduced risk of competition. This frees up both the contractor and
the supplier resources for innovation and, consequently, competitive advantage. The
reduced risk of competition is especially very attractive to suppliers - this risk can come
from a new supplier being developed or contractor establishing an in-house
manufacturing capacity.
Collaborative spot
Spot market, market,
investments in investments inS supply supply
Long-term laborative
to agreements spot market
Low - Part Complexity -> High
Figure 7.1. Satellite Part Supply Strategy Matrix
Key subcontract part-supplier-contractor elements to consider while using the Satellite
Part Supply Strategy Matrix:
1. Number of suppliers: single, dual/multiple
2. Availability of accurate demand forecasts
3. Supply risk
4. Supplier cost data: an information advantage like knowing the supplier cost of raw
material inputs can be used as a negotiation lever
5. Switching costs from the contractor's and from the supplier's perspective
6. Supplier's dependence on the contractor in terms of the total business volume
percentage. The more the dependence the better for the contractor. Higher
dependence is equivalent to captive capacity whereby double marginalization can be
avoided and at the same time most of the channel profit can be kept by the contractor
7. Part complexity, standardization
8. Supplier technological or innovation position
7.2 An Example Application of Supply Strategy Matrix
Figure 7.2 shows a summary of JCSAT-12 satellite data. JCSAT-12 is part of Lockheed
Martin's A2100 telecommunication satellite series that it is designed and built for JCSAT
Corporation of Japan.
Total 4_
Single source suppliers 7 17-50%
LTAsuppliers 4 1o.oo0%
# ~only one part suppliers 20 50.oO%
9 gnon-single source one part suppliers 17 42.50%
Total 179 _
Total single sourmce 14 7.82%
Parts with change (JSATn to JSAT12) 24 13.41%
Domestic parts 131 73.18%
Foreign parts 48 26.82%
Part complexity - High 18 o.o6%
Part complexity -Medium 161 89-94%
Not high complexity, not single source 148 82.68%
Not high compleidty, no change in design 139 77.65%
Total 14
With domestic suppliers 12 85-71%
With foreign suppliers 2 1429%
Part complexity - High _ 12 8571%
Part complexity - Medium 2 14-29
LTAs with single source suppliers 0 .0.0o%
Maximum #parts supplied by onesupplier 30
Minimum *parts supplied by one supplier 1
Total parts supplied by 2 biggest suppliers 57
fyg #parts per supplier (excluding 2 biggest) 3.21
Part quantity requirement range (75 percenfile) 1 to 4
Part delivery lead time range (some key parts) 4 to 12 months
Part sourcing cost range (some key parts) $1oo,ooo to a few million
Figure 7.2. JCSAT12 Sourcing Data
Under Subcontract Part Data, we see that majority of the parts are not high
complexity, not single source, and fairly standardized designs. Further, we observe that
Lockheed has very few LTAs in place, see LTA data. And, contrary to the intuition that
this research builds that the LTAs should be for less complex items, we see that most of
the LTAs are for the high complexity parts. Strategic concerns and the fact that LTAs are
a relatively new concept may explain these anomalies. Lockheed started doing LTAs
during the mid-90s; compare that with the fifty-year old satellite industry and we can
understand why Lockheed's JCSAT12 has low LTA penetration.
7.3 A Decision Framework for LTAs
LTAs discount prices by removing process inefficiencies. LTAs make business easy by
removing a lot of repetitive transactions and negotiation requirements. Understandably,
this saves money and makes the contractors more competitive. An LTA is a good lean
management tool; it removes waste. LTAs thus free up management to engage in more
strategic tasks, rather than having to negotiate often on an order-to-order basis.
Additionally, and apparently, LTAs provide cost savings as well because the contractor
can lock in a subcontract part for lower than spot rates.
However, these benefits are not guaranteed. The ease of business can become a
nightmare if there are too many design changes for a subcontract part and, subsequently,
the supplier start asking for additional compensation. If the currency exchange rate
fluctuates too much, or if the supplier raw material costs swell, the supplier may start
asking for money that was not budgeted for this project. The net result may be
unexpected project cost overruns and strained business relationship. From execution
perspective, an LTA may be altered or abandoned altogether. And thus, our
understanding is that LTA price is not the least price that can be negotiated but a price
that is less prone to risks listed above.
It may or may not be possible to write or negotiate a perfect LTA that completely
eliminates LTA risks listed above. However, it is certainly possible to understand the true
LTA costs better and to arrive at an LTA price where such risk is minimized. Historical
data analysis and analytical methods can be used to arrive at such an LTA price. Thus
there are two tasks at hand - 1) analyze LTA data, and 2) calculate a reference LTA
price.
7.3.1 Data Framework and Analysis
The LTA price calculation, laid out in section 7.3.2, is based on the hypothesis that future
spot rates, when appropriately transformed, provide the best estimate for LTA price. And
thus, this data framework and analysis is to be applied both to the LTA data and to the
spot market data. This section provides a framework of data elements that can be used to
capture present and historical LTA and spot data. The data thus captured is analyzed to
ascertain contractor-supplier strategic position and to arrive at total relevant cost for both
spot and LTA.
The framework consists of five components or matrices viz. Part Matrix, Supplier
Matrix, Supplier-Part Matrix, LTA Decision Matrix, and LTA Performance Matrix. If
necessary, these matrices can be further extended to capture data at a more
comprehensive level. Figure 7.3 below provides the schematic interrelationship between
these matrices.
Part M atrix
Spplie-Pt M~fatrix LTA Deision Matrix LTA Perfomnce Matrix
Supplier Matrix
Figure 7.3. LTA Measurement Schematic Diagram
Part Matrix - The Part Matrix, figure 7.4, components captures subcontract part data.
The key data includes number of suppliers, make-buy option, part standardization and
complexity. The part risk is the supply risk to be quantified from a strategic perspective.
The supply risk here is a function of number of suppliers and nationality of suppliers (risk
from government regulation). Overall the part data provides guidance about the nature of
contractor-supplier part relationship and the possibility of LTA. Once qualified with
enough historical data, part standardization will provide an answer to the question,
Number of Sppliers One Two, Many
suppler Depndence In-hoe cpacity
Part Standardization Ri Medium Low
Part Conplex ty H* Medium Low
Part Risk Strate* level
Figure 7.4. Part Matrix
"Whether we should have an LTA at all?" Part complexity refers to technological
complexity. This is an important input to make supplier qualification decisions. For
example, a contractor can use this data to decide whether to qualify a supplier for this
part. If the part complexity is high and the supplier is not known for its engineering
know-how then it may be best not to invest qualification money on this supplier, unless
the funding is provided by the supplier.
Supplier Matrix - The supplier matrix, figure 7.5, is a comprehensive approach to
develop a supplier scorecard for satellite systems supply chain. Supplier profile is the first
decision element in this matrix. A supplier has to be eligible to supply parts for the
demand over the LTA lead-time. Dependence on contractor, gross margin, company size,
network stability, and financial stability determine how aggressive the LTA pricing can
be. These elements also provide input to the supply risk assessment. Strategy,
management structure, and business suitability are dimensions that provide a deeper
qualitative insight into a supplier. For example, two suppliers may have similar risk
profile, similar company strengths, but if one is more aggressive in its strategy and the
other one is more accommodating then that supplier may be a better choice between the
two. Normalization factor has built in probability of a supplier's likelihood of requesting
price change due to changes in commodity prices or currency exchange rate.
Supplier certification,
ernment approval
Profile national arffiliation
Eellent, Good, Averap,
Supplier Gro Margin Poor
Excellent Good, AveraW,
Financial Stability Poor
Business with other
ontraors and tier-fI
Network Stability suppliers
Company Size Net worth
Stratic9 and Manaemenm t fit , M odum Low
AR Inr Detailed text
On-Orbit History Percmtal rate
riable (prie risk, currency
risk, other price chany
Normalization Factor requests)
Prcom Costs Variable value per order
E~lent, Good, Averam
R&D Investments Poor
Eellent Good, AveraW,
Technical & Scientific Expertise Poor
Exclusive Knowled Hi Medium, Low
IT ard Proess Competence High, Medium, Low
Figure 7.5. Supplier Matrix
Normalization factors are determined for spot market and for LTAs, these factors
are then used to calculate LTA prices. On an intuitive level this factor when multiplied
with the LTA (or spot) price tells the total expected cost of the supplier order. For
example, say a supplier quotes a spot price of $100,000 for a subcontract part. During
order execution, Lockheed's design team had to visit the supplier to explain design
nuances, a cost of $10,000. The supplier requested $3,000 for currency exchange rate
fluctuations and another $3,000 to accommodate commodity price increases. All in all,
the total relevant cost of this spot order is $116,000. The normalization factor thus will be
$116,000 /$100,000 or 1.16. With this normalization factor at hand, we would be able to
tell at the beginning the expected total cost of a spot order or of an LTA order.
Understandably, LTA and spot normalization factor values will be different.
Normalization factors are not calculated using just one order but are averaged using
historical data. A contractor can choose to maintain these factors at one of these levels -
supplier, supplier-part, part, or at companywide level.
Total relevant cost LTA, TRCL = LTA price + currency & commodity price adjustments
+ design change costs
Total relevant cost spot, TRCs = spot price + design change costs
Normalization factor LTA, NL = ZTRCL / ELTA price
Normalization factor spot, Ns = ETRCs / Ispot price
I is over the historical data. Note that transactional and administrative costs are ignored
in total relevant costs. Since these costs are additive, and not multiplicative, they are kept
out of the normalization factor.
The normalization factor is used to convert the LTA price into the total relevant
LTA cost. Similarly, normalization factor is also used to convert the spot market price
into the total relevant spot cost. The two prices thus become comparable. The last four
dimensions of the supplier matrix are based on the use of administrative applications,
advanced manufacturing technologies, and manufacturing improvement programs [19].
Supplier-Part Matrix - It is historical data of a supplier's performance vis-ai-vis a
subcontract part. Figure 7.6 below shows the dimensions maintained and analyzed at
supplier and part level. The supply risk is higher for a supplier with higher capacity
utilization. Subject to the level of detail that a contractor wants to bring to the data
analysis, some of the data in the Supplier Matrix can be also be maintained at the
Supplier-Part Matrix level.
FSupee .CosS ariable
Swhach Ciost fR4 Medium, Low
Supier Hir Meiuh , mLow
Dypenence on Contractor Hi Medium, Low
A factor of avwra irustry
Manufacturing Utilization capacity utilization
On-Orbit Histoy Peroentaw rate
Figure 7.6. Supplier-Part Matrix
LTA Decision Matrix - The LTA Decision Matrix provides decision values using data
from all the matrices listed here. It provides the LTA price range at which a contractor is
better off. The upper bound is determined by the spot price and lower bound is
determined by how-low-a-supplier-can-go without introducing supply risk into the order.
The price calculation framework provided in section 7.3.2 is used to arrive at the
normalized LTA cost. It is important to take into account various strategic lever that are
provided by the different matrices before a decision about an LTA is made. Figure 7.7
below illustrates the LTA decision matrix.
Part Matrix
Supplier Matrix
Supplier-Part Matrix
LTA Performance Matrix
Spot Rates
Figure 7.7. LTA Decision Matrix
LTA Performance Matrix - Performance evaluation is a key input to be able to make a
more informed decision about LTA and spot. An LTA may not be a good choice when
the price stability is low, when the supplier management is not up to the mark or when
the supplier is aggressive. Similarly, LTA may not be a good option for a part that's not
standardized. This matrix provides empirical, statistical awareness of costs and strategic
issues. Figure 7.8 provides an illustration of the LTA performance matrix.
Number of price canb= requats - due to
des'gn dmrBas, uway &164 con y
Price priwe chans or other reasons
Quality Number of defects
Delivery On time delivery perountag
Nmber of iues -e ions netiatios,
supplier price chant requests, payment
Part Standardization Number of desi~i chan requests
Figure 7.8. LTA Performance Matrix
7.3.2 LTA Price Calculation Model
A contractor's interest in LTAs is to bring certainty to the cost estimates it sends to the
customers and to improve its bottomline. LTAs enable this by providing ready cost
estimates, and by reducing process inefficiencies. LTAs, however, introduce price and
currency risks. These risks either make LTAs expensive or un-implementable. These
risks are modeled as normalization factors, discussed in section 7.3.1. The LTA prices
can be evaluated as a range whereby the contractor limits the maximum it is ready to pay
for a part and the supplier limits the minimum it is ready to sell a part for.
Maximum LTA price is the price at which the contractor is indifferent between
spot and LTA price. LTA equivalent of the spot price provides this maximum LTA price.
For building this model, we assumed that price is the only criteria to determine
indifference curve equivalence between LTA and spot. LTA and spot prices cannot be
compared without an appropriate transformation. This is because the cost of executing an
LTA order is not the same as the cost of executing a spot order. For example, an LTA
pegged at $100 might have an average $10 additional cost component while a spot price
pegged at $100 might come with an additional cost component of $12. This cost of
executing a spot and an LTA can be further divided into an additive and a multiplicative
component.
The additive part is the order overhead necessary to carry out the business. This
part is the process inefficiencies or process cost or transactional and administrative costs.
These inefficiencies are reduced by LTAs. The LTA process cost savings for the
contractor and the supplier are noted as A1 and A2 respectively. The sum of these process
efficiencies, or the spread "A1 + A2", is negotiating ground for an LTA price.
The multiplicative part is the part dependent on cost risk or order risk (its origin
can be LTA risks or other supply related risks.) The multiplicative parts are already
introduced as the spot and the LTA normalization factors - Ns and NL respectively. The
total cost of executing an LTA or a spot order is expressed as total landed cost. Thus, the
total landed cost for an LTA and spot order can be expressed the following way -
Total landed cost LTA, TLCL = PLTA* NL + AL
Total landed cost spot, TLCs = Pspot * Ns + As
where PLTA is the LTA rate, Pspot is the spot rate, AL is the LTA process cost and As is the
spot process cost.
A contractor is indifferent between LTA and spot order when
PLTA* NL + AL = Pspot* Ns + As
PLTA* NL = Pspot* Ns + As - AL
PLTA* NL = Pspot* Ns + A1 (where A1 is the contractor process saving introduced above)
PLTA = (Pspot* N + A1 )/ NL -------------------- -(equation 1)
Thus, whenever PLTA < (PSpot* Ns + A1 ) / NL contractor is better off doing an
LTA. The lower bound for PLTA is defined by supplier's indifference curve, while
minimizing LTA risks, between an LTA and spot. This price is simply -
PLTA = Pspot - A2 ----------
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - 
(equation 2)
where A2 is the supplier process saving introduced above) - (equation 2)
The LTA price should always be more than or equal to Pspot - A2.Note that
supplier LTA price does not have a multiplicative cost component because there are no
cost pressures or risks to the LTA price from the contractor (to the supplier.) The
contractor never requests the supplier to lower the contracted price because the contractor
is losing money on an order. The model LTA price follows the following range -
(Pspot - A2) : PLTA - ((PSpot* N + A1 ) / NL)
For a PLTA above this price range, the contractor would be better off with a spot
market rate. For a PLTA below this price range, either the supplier wont accept the price or
the LTA risks are significantly increased so as to make the LTA un-implementable.
These risks can lead to LTA termination or supplier price change requests. The LTA
price range, along-with strategic considerations, provides a subcontract manager with a
significant tool to negotiate LTA price. The sensitivity of the estimated spot price can
drive supplier behavior. If the prices are expected to stay stable, the supplier will be
comfortable giving up the benefits of the LTA to the contractor. If the prices are expected
to go up or lower the supplier may not give up a significant portion of the "A1 + A2"
spread.
Detailed steps to approximate an LTA price range -
1) Forecast future spot rates relevant for the LTA period, Pspot range. Such forecasts are
combination of forecasting satellite part demand over LTA length, and pegging prices for
that demand. The prices can be affected by micro and macro economic factors. Real
options is one method to arrive at spot rates using probabilities and price events.
2) Find normalization factors; NL for LTA and Ns for spot market. These factors when
multiplied to LTA or spot rates provide the expected total relevant cost for that rate.
3) Estimate A1 and A2, the process cost savings for the contractor and the supplier.
4) Use spot rates from step 1, normalization factors from step 2, process cost savings
from step 3, equations 1 & 2, and derive LTA rate range (highs and lows) for every spot
price.
5) LTA period is a short two-year duration. The LTA price highs and lows (obtained in
step 4) can be averaged separately to obtain one LTA range. Alternatively, use net
present value (NPV) and a suitable discount rate, and subsequently equal period
payments can be derived from the NPV value range (upper and lower bound for LTA
price). The discount rate can be, but is not limited to, Lockheed's cost of capital and
inflation rate.
Figure 7.9 provides an example illustration of LTA rate range calculation for a
single period and it also shows the sensitivity of NL to Ns. LTA high values are
calculated using "(Pspot* Ns + A1 ) NL" and LTA low values calculated using "Pspot -
A2" -
Spot price $100
Contractor
process
efficiency $5
Supplier process
efficiency $6
Normalizati
Normalization on factor, LTA high LTA low
factor, LTA spot value value
0.9 1.1 $128 $94
0.95 1.1 $121 $94
1 1.1 $115 $94
1.05 1.1 $110 $94
1.1 1.1 $105 $94
1.15 1.1 $100 $94
1.2 1.11 $96 $94
1.3 1.1 $88 $94
Figure 7.9. LTA Rate Calculation
For a given pair of NL and Ns, this figure shows the potential LTA range. An LTA
is possible as long as the LTA normalization factor is within the range 0.9 and 1.2. Once
the normalization factor takes a value 1.3 (or higher) there are no valid values in the
range.
Ability to predict the future spot rates and ability to calculate supplier and
contractor process efficiencies, and normalization factors is the main challenge to be able
to use this model for LTA evaluations and decision. Real options provides one
calculation framework for evaluating spot prices using probabilities and expected prices.
The probabilities and associated future prices are used to assess the value of a subcontract
part. The assessment includes, among other things, the raw material prices - calculated at
Lockheed or supplier GPA estimated prices, administrative cost, production cost,
engineering cost and project management costs. The estimated LTA price, along with
strategic considerations, can be used as a decision tool to assess supplier LTA price.
8 Key Insights
Bilateral oligopoly, a few contractors and a few suppliers per part, is the stable state for
the satellite contractors and suppliers. The contractor landscape hardly changes and
whenever the supplier landscape changes such that there are supply risks or dominant
suppliers, the contractors make appropriate investments to bring the market back to a
stable state. Whenever the suppliers are in the dominant positions it is difficult to get into
contract negotiations or write LTA contracts at attractive prices.
Government regulations play an important part in contractor selling and buying
decisions. The satellite customer list is restricted by the U.S. regulatory laws; these
restrictions can limit the product sale itself or limit the level of technology used in the
satellite product. Internationally, governments consider aerospace, including satellites, an
industry of strategic importance. These governments fund various satellite projects
without necessarily considering profits or losses. Such national interests can lead to a
problem of global overcapacity and thus, potentially, can make the commercial satellite
industry unprofitable.
A commercial satellite is a mature product and a commodity. The satellite
systems are being successfully launched and deployed since late 1950s. In terms of
functionality and service that a satellite can provide, satellites are more similar than
different. The difference between satellites is largely due to configuration demand and
due to technological improvements in the manufacturing process. The market for
commercial satellite is very price sensitive. Commercial customers buy satellites using
competitive bids and price is the single most important factor for winning such bids.
A satellite is designed and built to specification. Every satellite is a different
product; different in terms of how the final product looks, and what all goes into making
the product. A satellite can have a range or receivers, sensors, or converters in it. This
configuration then requires a different structure so as to have a stable product. There are
no economies of scale in the industry.
LTAs are flexible contracts that can be used to extract just the supplier surplus and
nothing more (than the supplier surplus.) LTAs provide process efficiencies; these
process efficiencies and other supplier incentives can be quantified as the supplier surplus
available for the contractor. LTA risks are introduced, which either increase the effective
contract price or make the contract un-implementable, if the contractor tries to extract
more than the supplier surplus.
A disadvantage of LTAs is that these agreements are implementable for
standardized parts only. A majority of subcontract parts cannot be even considered for
such agreements. Thus, part standardization should be given a high priority.
Alternatively, to accommodate parts with less standardization into the contract structure,
contractors can explore other form of contracts; for example, fixed price plus an audit
system. It should be ascertained if the sum of fixed and audit costs are better than spot
rates before such a contract form is adopted.
9 Further Research
This thesis presents a theoretical framework for LTAs. Data can be used to further this
research. The expected and actual values for every new LTA or spot prices should be
compared and contrasted, so as to ascertain the robustness and applicability of this model.
It would be important to statistically calibrate the behavior of the normalization factor
variable.
This framework relies on ability to estimate future spot prices. The next avenue of
research is to build a concrete, and detailed forecasting model for price estimation. This
model will have the ability to estimate price events and to assign appropriate probabilities
to such events. After such a model is built, it is necessary to put the model through
statistical analysis for price sensitivity.
In section 7.2, JCSAT12's sourcing data, we saw that LTAs weren't used as much
as we had expected. And the LTAs were done more for higher complexity than for
medium complexity parts. This is counterintuitive. While it is possible to guess reasons
for such anomalies it is best to research the historical data further to be able to fish out the
underlying factors. Focused case studies of part subcontract sourcing can be used to
understand LTAs better.
Another area of research would be to explore how firms develop supplier
networks. In particular, how firms maintain cost-competitive supplier networks while
meeting the demands of both the government and the commercial customers. The LTAs
can also be researched for their strategic impact on innovation and collaboration.
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Appendices
Key Definitions
Bilateral Oligopoly: A market situation in which there are a few powerful buyers and a
few powerful sellers.
Bilateral Monopoly: A market situation in which there is one buyer and one seller.
Build to Specification: Manufacturing to the design and materials specifications provided
by the customer.
Commercial Satellite: a satellite, space system, that is not used by military and, generally,
does not have any government regulatory clauses restricting its manufacture or sale.
Commodity: it is a satellite part which does not require a design specification and is
generally available in the market to purchase
(Prime) Contractor: satellite manufacturer or the company responsible for assembly and
final delivery of satellite to the customer; e.g. Lockheed Martin, Boeing
Customer: a customer is the buyer of a satellite; most often, it is the government, military,
and the telecommunication companies
General pricing agreement (GPA): GPAs are used to procure commodities. A GPA is an
agreement between a contractor and a supplier whereby the supplier agrees to sell (to
contractor) specific quantities and set prices (that are agreed upon by a contractor and a
supplier.)
Long-Term Agreement (LTA): LTAs are used to procure subcontract items. An LTA is
an agreement between a contractor and a supplier whereby the supplier agrees to build to
specification a subcontract item at a set price. These agreements are usually two years in
length and may or may not have quantity commitments.
Monopsony: a market situation in which there is one buyer, known as the monopsonist. It
is opposite of monopoly which has only one supplier.
Net Present Value: net present value is the present value of all future cash flows. The
present value is obtained using a discount rate; this discount rate can be cost of capital of
inflation rate.
Offset: offsets are concessions where, in the event of an overseas procurement, the seller
compensates the purchasing country, or the buyer, for a perceived loss to the economy.
Offsets may require co-production, subcontractor production, investment, and/or
technology transfers.
Spot Market: this refers to one-time buy and absence of use of contracts or other
agreements for this buy. It is usually a competitive bid sent out to eligible suppliers.
Subcontract Part or Item: an assembly item, or part of a satellite, that a contractor out-
sources to a subcontractor (instead of manufacturing it in-house).
Subcontractor: a supplier who supplies or manufactures and delivers subcontract parts to
contractors. In this thesis, the term subcontractor is used synonymously with supplier.
Abbreviations
EADS - European Aeronautic, Defense and Space Company
GPA - General Pricing Agreement
ITAR - International Traffic in Arms Regulations
LMSSC - Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company
LTA - Long-Term Agreement
NPV - Net Present Value
PIE - Potential Industry Earnings
